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The effects of auditory distraction in memory tasks have, to date, been examined
with procedures that minimize participants’ control over their own memory processes.
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to metacognitive control factors which might
affect memory performance. In this study, we investigate the effects of auditory distraction
on metacognitive control of memory, examining the effects of auditory distraction in
recognition tasks utilizing the metacognitive framework of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996),
to determine whether strategic regulation of memory accuracy is impacted by auditory
distraction. Results replicated previous ﬁndings in showing that auditory distraction impairs
memory performance in tasksminimizing participants’metacognitive control (forced-report
test). However, the results revealed also that when metacognitive control is allowed
(free-report tests), auditory distraction impacts upon a range of metacognitive indices. In
the present study, auditory distraction undermined accuracy of metacognitive monitoring
(resolution), reduced conﬁdence in responses provided and, correspondingly, increased
participants’ propensity to withhold responses in free-report recognition. Crucially, changes
in metacognitive processes were related to impairment in free-report recognition perfor-
mance, as the use of the “don’t know” option under distraction led to a reduction in
the number of correct responses volunteered in free-report tests. Overall, the present
results show how auditory distraction exerts its inﬂuence on memory performance via
both memory and metamemory processes.
Keywords: metacognition, memory, recognition, auditory distraction, irrelevant speech
INTRODUCTION
Distraction, whether in the form of external stimuli or self-
generated thoughts, accompanies a vast spectrum of our everyday
activities. Much of this can be avoided by relatively simple actions,
like closing one’s eyes if the distraction is visual, but some forms
of distraction cannot be done away with so easily. Auditory dis-
traction in particular is impossible to avoid unless we have control
over the source of distraction, or else access to noise-reduction
technology (e.g., headsets). If we do not have such control, for
example, when we are in a supermarket and music plays over the
store’s loudspeakers, our cognitive processes need to unfold in
the presence of distraction. This can constitute a serious problem
inasmuch as numerous studies have found that the efﬁcacy of cog-
nitive processes suffers in the presence of auditory distraction (see
reviews by Hughes and Jones, 2003; Beaman, 2005a; Jones et al.,
2010). Most relevantly to the purpose of the present study, decades
of studies of memory processes have found that auditory distrac-
tionpresent either at encodingor retrieval negatively impacts upon
memory performance (e.g., Broadbent, 1982; Salamé and Badde-
ley, 1982, 1986; Miles et al., 1991; Jones and Macken, 1993; Elliott
and Cowan, 2005; Bell et al., 2013).
Although the negative impact of auditory distraction upon
memory performance is well-documented, what still remains
unexplored is how people strive to adapt to auditory distraction
they cannot avoid. Recent developments in theoretical approaches
to memory processes stress that memory processes are far from
passive, rather they are subject to a number of control opera-
tions. A metacognitive approach to memory describes how people
monitor their memory performance under a variety of condi-
tions and how the products of metacognitive monitoring are
employed in an attempt to optimize memory performance (see
Koriat, 2007, for a review). Thus, for example, people try to
establish whether encoding of information is satisfactory and,
whenever this process of monitoring informs them that certain
information is poorly learned, additional study time may be allo-
cated to this information (Thiede and Dunlosky, 1999). Similarly,
during retrieval people monitor whether retrieved information
is likely to be correct and whenever this process of monitoring
informs them that certain information may be incorrect people
may choose to withhold it from a memory report (Koriat and
Goldsmith, 1996; Higham, 2007). The question that we begin
to address here is how the processes of metacognitive moni-
toring and control at test are affected by, and feed back onto,
auditory distraction. Suppose effective metacognitive monitor-
ing and control allows individuals to compensate for the impact
of distraction (interpreted here as an outcome). Discovering
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the circumstances under which this is possible would demon-
strate the effects of metacognition on distraction and would
constitute a practical as well as a theoretical advance. Alterna-
tively, suppose that effectivemetacognitivemonitoring and control
becomes more difﬁcult when distracted (i.e., being in the state
of distraction), the monitoring of output may be disturbed as
much as the initial encoding of items in a memory task, for
example. This would demonstrate an impact of distraction on
metacognition.
To describe how people monitor the accuracy of the products
of retrieval processes and how they exert metacognitive control,
Koriat andGoldsmith (1996) developed a frameworkwithinwhich
to examine the decisionsmade as towhether retrieved information
should be volunteered or withheld from a memory report. In this
framework it is assumed that responding to a memory question
unfolds in three steps. At the ﬁrst step, a person accesses memory
to generate the best, or most likely, candidate response to the ques-
tion. In the next step, the person monitors the retrieval process,
assigning conﬁdence that his/her best candidate response is cor-
rect [assigning conﬁdence in this way may be either a strategic or a
wholly unconscious process – we are ambivalent on this point.
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) use the more strategic-sounding
term “assessing probability” to describe this process but there
is no necessary assumption that the person is making subjec-
tive probability judgments either consciously or deliberately, (see
also Goldsmith et al., 2014)]. Finally, in the third step, the per-
son compares the conﬁdence for a given candidate response to a
criterial or threshold level of conﬁdence which warrants volun-
teering of candidate responses in a memory report. If conﬁdence
in the correctness of a given candidate response is higher than
criterion, this candidate response is volunteered. However, if con-
ﬁdence in the correctness of this candidate response is lower than
criterion, it is withheld and the individual responds “don’t know”
to the memory question (see Figure 1).
Crucially, this framework postulates that, whenever with-
holding responses is allowed, the ultimate memory performance
observed is jointly shaped by memory processes responsible
for generating candidate responses and metacognitive processes
responsible for deciding which candidate responses should be
volunteered. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) describe two differ-
ent indices of memory performance. The input-bound accuracy
(IBA) measure refers the number of correct responses in a test
relative to the number of questions asked (which is usually equiv-
alent to the number of items presented for study). Essentially, it is a
measure of the quantity of correct information volunteered at out-
put. Thus, for example, if persons A and B are given 20 questions
and respond correctly to ﬁve of these, then the IBA measure for
both these individuals is 25%. The output-bound accuracy (OBA)
measure refers the number of correct responses in a test relative to
the overall information that a person provides in this test. Essen-
tially, it is a measure of the quality of memory output. Thus, if A
declines to answer 15/20 questions then A’s OBA is 100%, whereas
if B responds incorrectly to ﬁve of the questions, then B’s OBA
measure is 50%. Although in a forced-report test IBA and OBA
FIGURE 1 | How distraction might affect metacognition and
metacognition might affect distraction. Adapted from Goldsmith
et al. (2014). Dashed boxes represent operations which might be
affected by distraction. Memory, its retrieval or monitoring
processes might be disrupted by distraction, and the meta-cognitive
process of setting a response threshold might mediate the impact
of distraction. Note that if distraction lowers conﬁdence in an
output, then this will have the same negative effect on
volunteering the item as raising the report threshold for that
output.
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measures are necessarily identical, in free-report they become dif-
ferent measures of memory performance, sensitive to changes in
metacognitive processes.
In their seminal paper, Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) described
several scenarios by which changes in memory and/or metacog-
nitive processes affect IBA and OBA measures. Changes in
underlyingmemoryhave quite straightforward consequences: bet-
ter memory should be linked to increased correct responding,
whether measured in reference to the volume of studied informa-
tion (the IBA measure) or to the volume of output information
(the OBA measure). However, the consequences of changes in
metacognitive processes formemoryperformance are less straight-
forward. Broadly speaking, people can modify performance by
varying the criterial value of conﬁdence, which is then cap-
tured by IBA and OBA measures in different ways. If people
want to increase the quantity of correct information provided
in their memory reports they can lower the criterion, ensuring
that more candidate responses achieve or exceed this criterion.
This should generally result in an increase in the IBA measure.
However, because the ability to distinguish between correct and
incorrect candidate responses is almost always going to be less
than perfect, lowering the criterion can also result in volunteering
some incorrect candidate responses. In fact, the more candidate
responses are volunteered, the poorer the quality of these addi-
tionally volunteered responses should normally be, leading to
a reduction in the OBA measure. Consequently, the IBA and
OBA measures are subjected to a trade-off: an increase in the
quantity obtained by lowering report criterion should generally
be accompanied by a reduction in the quality and, similarly,
an increase in the quality obtained by adopting a more strin-
gent criterion should generally be accompanied by a reduction
in the quantity of correct answers volunteered in a memory
report.
Currently, little is known about how auditory distraction
impacts upon metacognitive regulation of memory responses as
captured by the Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) framework. The
majority of studies on auditory distraction have used either free
or serial recall tests which allow participants to withhold answers
and respond “don’t know.” Such tests do not allow for disentan-
gling memory and metacognitive effects of distraction because
omissions from a memory report can reﬂect either a failure to
access an appropriate memory trace or a change in metacognitive
processing in one or more ways. For example, participants may
become less conﬁdent of their candidate responses, so that fewer
of them pass the report criterion. Alternatively, participants may
become more cautious and adopt a more stringent report criterion
(see Figure 1). To assess any presumed metacognitive component
of distraction it is ﬁrst necessary to present participants with a test
(such as recognition) in which responding is commonly forced,
not allowing participants to respond “don’t know.” Whilst this
is comparatively rare in studies of auditory distraction, a sub-
set of studies have employed such recognition memory tests. For
example, Beaman and Jones (1997) investigated the effects of audi-
tory distraction (sequences of non-sense words which participants
were asked to ignore played over headphones) on a two-alternative
forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test and found reliable impair-
ment in recognition performance in the distraction condition (see
also LeCompte, 1994; Stokes andArnell, 2012). Since performance
in forced recognition tests is not dependent on metacognitive pro-
cesses of response withholding, this result conﬁrms that auditory
distraction impairs memory access directly.
The outstanding question then remainswhether impairment to
memory by auditory distraction is also accompanied by changes
in metacognitive processes, or whether the distraction is lim-
ited to memory. For example, do people try to compensate for
the impairment caused by distraction? It is possible that know-
ing that distraction impairs memory access, participants could
change their report criterion in order to compensate for distrac-
tion and volunteer responses held with lower conﬁdence, thus
increasing the quantity of output. Indeed, a recent study by Per-
fect et al. (2011) examined the effects of distraction at retrieval
and eye-closure (as a strategic response) on memory for actions
and found that distraction did not reduce correct responding but
instead increased the number of incorrect responses (an effect par-
tially mitigated by eye closure). As noted by Perfect et al. (2011)
such a pattern of results is most easily explained if distraction
impairs memory and participants react to this impairment by
adopting a more liberal report criterion, thus volunteering can-
didate responses held with lower conﬁdence. In other words,
participants in this study could strive to increase the IBA mea-
sure of memory performance, sacriﬁcing the OBA measure in the
process.
It should be also noted, however, that results obtained by Per-
fect et al. (2011) are atypical for the auditory distraction of the type
brieﬂy reviewed here, which more usually reduces the number of
correct responses volunteered. This is particularly noticeable in
free recall where the difference between “irrelevant speech” and
quiet conditions is often evident only in the number of correct
items volunteered (where there are typically few or no incorrect
items in the recall protocol – the exception being when the irrele-
vant speech is semantically related to the to-be-recalled items and
intrusions from the speech into the recall protocol then become
relatively common; see Beaman, 2004; Beaman et al., 2013). This
common result may suggest that participants typically do not
become more liberal in their reporting strategies under distrac-
tion. Such a conclusion may, however, be premature. If distraction
impairs memory, it may also impair the resolution of metacog-
nitive monitoring, that is, people’s ability to distinguish between
their correct and incorrect candidate responses.
As described by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), the ability to reg-
ulate memory performance, crucially depends on the resolution of
metacognitive monitoring. The worse people are in distinguish-
ing between correct and incorrect candidate responses, the less
efﬁcient their attempts to increase IBA will be. When participants
decide to volunteer information held with lower conﬁdence but
resolution of their monitoring is poor, a substantial proportion
of additionally volunteered responses will be incorrect, exert-
ing little inﬂuence on IBA while at the same time undermining
the OBA measure of memory performance. If auditory distrac-
tion were to impair the resolution of metacognitive monitoring
at retrieval, then this could render any participants’ attempts to
increase the quantity of correct information in a memory report
futile. Worse still, it could degrade their memory performance
further by increasing the rate of intrusions. However, the extent
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to which resolution of metacognitive monitoring is affected by
auditory distraction is currently not known.
The present study was designed to examine the effects of audi-
tory distraction on both memory and metacognitive monitoring
and control of retrieval. To this purpose, we used a procedure
in which participants studied and were tested on pairs of unre-
lated words, with both study and test phases performed either
in silence or under conditions of auditory distraction. The tests
we used were 2AFC recognition tests, in which participants were
asked to discriminate between a target pair and a foil pair (the
types of targets and distracters used in the study are described
later). Crucially, the recognition tests were speciﬁcally designed
to assess both memory and metacognitive processes. Each trial of
the test consisted of three separate steps (see Hanczakowski et al.,
2013, for this type of a testing procedure). In an initial free-report
step, participants were instructed to preserve the quality of their
reports and to endorse one of the alternatives only if they were
sure it was correct, while responding “don’t know” if they were
not sure. In the subsequent forced-report step, the “don’t know”
option was no longer available and participants were asked to
endorse one of the alternatives even if it required guessing. Finally,
in the third step, participants were asked to provide a conﬁdence
judgment regarding the accuracy of a decision they made during
forced-report.
This procedure allows for describing participants’ behavior in
terms of the concepts developed in the Koriat and Goldsmith
(1996) framework. The data from the initial free-report step
allows for examining which of the candidate responses are vol-
unteered. In conjunction with conﬁdence judgments obtained
for volunteered and withheld responses, this gives a basis upon
which to assess the report criterion participants adopt in various
conditions (e.g., under distraction). The forced-report test mean-
while serves as a relatively pure measure of the accuracy of direct
memory access. Finally, the conﬁdence judgments collected for
responses provided in the forced-report step allow for examin-
ing the resolution of metacognitive monitoring, i.e., participants’
ability to distinguish between their correct and incorrect candi-
date responses. This framework was employed to assess the impact
of auditory distraction on memory and metacognitive processes.
Speciﬁcally, we were interested: (1) whether distraction impairs
memory access, as assessed in the forced-report test (a direct effect
of distraction on cognition), (2) whether distraction impairs the
resolution of metacognitive monitoring (an effect of distraction
on a metacognitive process), (3) whether participants modify their
report criterion under distraction (metacognition thereby having
a modifying effect on the observed impact of distraction), and (4)
how any possible changes in memory and metacognitive processes
caused by distraction are reﬂected in the IBA and OBA measures
of memory performance.
Apart from manipulating the presence of distraction at study
and test, we also manipulated the nature of the recognition test.
The manipulation of the type of test was introduced to examine
the impact of auditory distraction on memory and metacognition
under testing conditions varying in the contribution of controlled
retrieval processes required. A recent investigation of auditory dis-
traction revealed that negative effects of distraction on recognition
performance were conﬁned to conditions that require controlled
retrieval, such as retrieval of contextual details, and may not be
revealed in simple old/new judgments that can be made based on
familiarity (Wais and Gazzaley, 2011). In our study, each list of
pairs of words participants studied was followed by three sepa-
rate tests, each using one third of the studied pairs as a source
of targets and each presented in the three-step format described
above. The ﬁrst two tests were a 2AFC associative recognition
test and a simple 2AFC recognition test. In the 2AFC associa-
tive recognition test foils were pairs composed of two previously
studied words recombined to create a novel pair. It was not possi-
ble to succeed in this test by identifying one or both of the words
as unfamiliar (as both had previously been encountered in the
experimental context). Instead, participants needed to recollect
which pairs had previously appeared in which combination. In
the simple 2AFC recognition test targets were previously studied
pairs and foils were always composed of two novel words. In this
test, participants could succeed if they if they recognized the tar-
get (successful identiﬁcation of the target) or if they identiﬁed
either or both of the words as unfamiliar (successful rejection of
a foil). The results obtained by Wais and Gazzaley (2011) lead
to the prediction that the effects of auditory distraction should
occur in the associative test, which relies on recollection, but
not in the simple test, which can be completed with the use of
familiarity.
It is important to note that, although simple recognition can be
completed with the use of familiarity, recollection may still con-
tribute to performance because reinstating an intact study pair at
test may cue the pairwise association established between words
at study (Cohn and Moscovitch, 2007). To provide a stronger test
of the idea that the effects of auditory distraction are conﬁned
to recollection, we included a third type of test. The third test
was a recombined 2AFC recognition test in which foils were again
composed of two novel words (as in the simple test) but targets
were pairs composed of recombined words, which were words
included at study in different pairs. In this recombined test partic-
ipants were asked to endorse pairs composed of two studiedwords,
regardless of whether these pairs had originally appeared together.
Because the original word–word association that could serve as
a memory cue is not reinstated at test for the recombined pairs,
the contribution of recollection to performance in this test should
be further reduced. Thus, if auditory distraction impacts upon
recollection only, it should have minimal impact upon this recom-
bined test. A graphical example of the testing procedure is given in
Figure 2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-two undergraduates from Cardiff University (mean
age = 21.66, range 18–40, 5 males) participated for course credit
or small monetary compensation.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN
We chose 560 4- to 8-letter words from the MRC Psycholinguis-
tic database (Coltheart, 1981), out of which 224 were used as a
source of novel foils in recognition tests. These were paired to cre-
ate 112 pairs to be included in four simple recognition tests and
four recombined recognition tests. The remaining 336 words were
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FIGURE 2 | Representation of the experimental design.
randomly paired to create the 168 pairs presented at study. These
study pairs were assigned to four different lists of 42 pairs. Each
participant studied all four lists of pairs, two in the distraction
condition and two in the quiet condition. The assignment of a
list to condition was counterbalanced across participants. Pairs of
words were presented across the center of a computer screen in 30
point size Times New Roman font.
The pairs in each list were further divided into three sets of 14
pairs each, which were used in three separate recognition tests fol-
lowing each list. In the simple recognition tests, studied pairs were
presented alongside foil pairs created from two novel, previously
unseen, words. In the associative recognition tests, studied pairs
were presented alongside foil pairs created by presenting previ-
ously seen words in a new combination. Words for these new
combinations were taken from the set of pairs that were used as
targets in the same test. For example, if the pairs SLEEP–DAIRY
andTABLE–CHURCHhadpreviously beenpresented, a foilmight
be SLEEP–CHURCH or TABLE–DAIRY. Thus, in the associative
recognition test each studied word was presented twice: once in a
target pair and once in a foil pair (see Figure 2). In the recombined
tests, recombined pairs (e.g., SLEEP–CHURCH) were presented
along foil pairs created from two novel, previously unseen, words.
The assignment of pairs to the type of test was counterbalanced
across participants.
The study conformed to a 2 (distraction condition: silent vs.
auditory distraction) × 3 (type of test: simple, associative, recom-
bined recognition) within-participants design. Distraction was
manipulated between lists, whereas type of test was manipulated
within lists.
Auditory distraction was created by recording words from 18
different semantic categories (Yoon et al., 2004). 15 words, non-
overlapping with words presented in the study lists, were taken
from each semantic category. The words were spoken in female
voice and were recorded at 16- bit resolution and a sampling
rate of 44 KHz. The recorded words were combined into two
continuous streams of speech, with individual words spoken at
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the approximate rate of 1 per 750 ms. One of these streams was
used for each of the two lists studied and tested in the distraction
condition.
PROCEDURE
Participants studied four lists of pairs, each followed by three
recognition tests. The order in which the lists were presented and
the order of the pairs within each list was random for each partic-
ipant. In the study phase, each pair was presented individually for
1500 ms, with 500 ms interval between pairs. Three recognition
tests immediately followed the study phase for a given list. Each
recognition test (simple, associative, recombined) was preceded by
speciﬁc instructions, explaining to participants what constituted
a target and what constituted a foil in the test. The procedure for
all tests consisted of three steps, always administered in the same
order. First, target and foil pairs were presented with numbers
“1” and “2” (randomly chosen for targets and foils) and a “don’t
know” option below each pair. In this free-report step, partici-
pants were asked to maximize accuracy and thus indicate a target
(by pressing “1” or “2”) only when they were sure which pair
is a target, and to respond “don’t know,” by pressing the space-
bar, otherwise. Immediately after the response, the pairs were
presented again, this time without the “don’t know” option and
participants were again asked to indicate which pair they thought
they recognized. Finally, the screen was cleared and participants
were asked to type in a conﬁdence judgment on a 50 (“guess”)–
100 (“sure”) % scale that their response in the forced-report step
was correct. The time for responding in all three steps was not
limited.
Auditory distraction was played over the noise-canceling head-
phones during study and test for two lists (the remaining two were
studied and tested in silence). Auditory distraction started with
the onset of the ﬁrst study pair in each list and also with the ﬁrst
test pair in each of the three recognition tests. It was however,
switched off when participants were reading instructions for each
of the tests.
Participants took about 30 min to complete the procedure.
RESULTS
We organize the result section according to the questions posed
in Introduction and referring to (1) memory, (2) resolution of
metacognitive monitoring, (3) report criterion, and (4) the IBA
and OBA measures of performance. To further disentangle the
memory and metamemory effects of distraction on IBA and
OBA measures, we also analyze gains of using the “don’t know”
option in terms of quality of volunteered responses and losses in
terms of quantity of volunteered correct responses. The descriptive
statistics can be found in Table 1.
MEMORY
The recognition tests used in the present study were 2AFC tests
and thus recognition hit rates in these tests serve as a measure of
recognition discrimination. We analyzed hit rates in forced-report
recognition tests, which did not allow for withholding responses
and thus remained unaffected by any effects distraction could
have on metacognitive monitoring and control of retrieval. For
completeness, in this and later analyses both partial η2and η2
are reported as effect sizes. Partial η2 is arguably a more appro-
priate effect-size measure for repeated measures designs because
error due to the participant is always included in the denomina-
tor when calculating η2 (hence partial η2 will give a larger effect
size estimate than η2 for such designs), however,η2 is more readily
transformed for purposes of meta-analysis and other comparisons
across studies. A 2 (distraction: present vs. absent) × 3 (type of
test: simple, associative, recombined) repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) on hit rates in forced-report recognition
yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of distraction, F(1,41) = 13.85,
MSE = 0.01, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25, η2 = 0.15, by which per-
formance was better when distraction was absent in the quiet
condition than when distraction was present. A main effect of
test was also signiﬁcant, F(2,82) = 13.18, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.24, η2 = 0.05. This effect arose because, collapsing across
distraction conditions, recognition performance was better in the
recombined recognition test than in the associative recognition
test, t(41) = 2.59, SE = 0.02, p = 0.01, and still better in the simple
recognition than in the recombined recognition test, t(41) = 2.53,
SE = 0.02, p = 0.02. The interaction of distraction and type of
test was not signiﬁcant, F < 1, indicating that distraction dis-
rupted forced responding hit-rates on all types of tests to a similar
extent.
Altogether, these results show that auditory distraction neg-
atively affects memory processes, which ﬁnds its reﬂection in
impaired memory performance on tests in which participants
cannot withhold answers. In this, our results support the earlier
ﬁnding documenting distraction effects in forced-report tests (e.g.,
Beaman and Jones, 1997). However, these results do not support
the hypothesis that distraction is more harmful to performance
on tests based on recollection than tests based on familiarity (see
Wais and Gazzaley, 2011). We assumed that performance in the
simple recognition test could rely on both familiarity and recol-
lection whereas performance in associative recognition would rely
mostly on recollection and performance in recombined recogni-
tion would rely mostly on familiarity. The pattern of differences
in the level of performance seems at least consistent with these
assumptions, with performance in simple recognition (supported
by two processes) reliably higher than performance in the remain-
ing two tests (supported by one process). Despite these differences
in performance, however, distraction had a similar disruptive
effect on all these tests. We return to this observation in the
Discussion.
RESOLUTION OF METACOGNITIVE MONITORING
We turn now to the resolution of metacognitive monitoring,
which is participants’ ability to distinguish between their own cor-
rect and incorrect candidate responses1. Resolution is assessed
by examining the relationship between conﬁdence judgments
1Resolution is one aspect of the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring. The
other aspect is referred to as calibration. Whereas resolution computed based on
conﬁdence judgments captures the degree to which correct candidate responses
receive higher judgments than incorrect responses, calibration measures capture
the degree to which mean of conﬁdence judgments correspond to the mean mem-
ory performance. Calibration scores are usually interpreted in terms of realism
of metacognitive monitoring: when mean conﬁdence judgments are lower than
memory performance participants are said to be underconﬁdent and when mean
conﬁdence judgments are higher than memory performance participants are said
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Table 1 |Table showing mean recognition accuracy (hit rate) in the forced-report tests, resolution of metacognitive monitoring (measured by
area under the curve,AUC ), report criterion adopted in free-report tests (measured by the Prc measure), output-bound accuracy in the
free-report tests (OBA), and input-bound accuracy in the free-report tests (IBA).
Distraction Quiet
Simple
recognition
Associative
recognition
Recombined
recognition
Simple
recognition
Associative
recognition
Recombined
recognition
Forced-report accuracy 0.78 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02) 0.74 (0.02) 0.83 (0.02) 0.73 (0.03) 0.79 (0.02)
AUC 0.73 (0.02) 0.67 (0.03) 0.66 (0.03) 0.78 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02) 0.71 (0.03)
Prc 66.97 (2.50) 65.26 (2.31) 68.03 (2.65) 66.32 (2.56) 65.53 (2.14) 67.11 (2.52)
OBA 0.90 (0.02) 0.80 (0.03) 0.83 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02) 0.81 (0.03) 0.87 (0.02)
IBA 0.49 (0.03) 0.47 (0.03) 0.44 (0.04) 0.59 (0.03) 0.53 (0.03) 0.53 (0.03)
Gains in OBA 0.12 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.08 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
Losses in IBA 0.29 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 0.30 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02)
Mean conﬁdence 77.12 (1.79) 77.19 (1.69) 71.52 (1.91) 80.70 (1.68) 80.01 (1.73) 77.14 (1.81)
Proportion “don’t know” 0.38 (0.06) 0.35 (0.05) 0.42 (0.07) 0.30 (0.05) 0.29 (0.04) 0.34 (0.05)
Gains in OBA between forced- and free-report tests, losses in IBA between forced- and free-report tests, conﬁdence judgments provided for correct forced-report
recognition decisions and “don’t know” responses for answers correct on the forced-report tests are all proportion measures. Standard errors of the means are given
in parentheses.
given to responses in forced-report test and correctness of these
responses, under the assumption that participants’ metacogni-
tive monitoring is more accurate if they are more conﬁdent
in their correct responses and less conﬁdent in their incorrect
responses. Traditionally, gamma correlations have been used to
assess this relationship by researchers interested in metacogni-
tion (e.g., Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996) although other measures
of calibration and resolution (e.g., over/under conﬁdence statis-
tic, point bi-serial, resolution and slope correlation) are available
and, in particular, have been used more extensively by researchers
interested in the relationship between eyewitness conﬁdence and
accuracy (e.g., Juslin et al., 1996; Olsson et al., 1998; Brewer, 2006;
Brewer and Wells, 2006; Krug, 2007; Sauer et al., 2010). Recent
work in the area of metacognition has also revealed that other
measures – those based on signal detection theory – better serve
to reveal the accuracy-conﬁdence relationship in these judgments
also (Masson and Rotello, 2009; see also Higham, 2002, 2007).
Accordingly, we used a non-parametric measure of area under the
curve (AUC) to assess resolution of metacognitive monitoring as
expressed in conﬁdence judgments2. A 2 (distraction) × 3 (type of
test)ANOVA on theAUC measure yielded a signiﬁcant main effect
of distraction, F(1,36) = 4.13, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.049, η2p = 0.10,
to be overconﬁdent. However, the psychological interpretations of calibration mea-
sures have recently been questioned based on the observation that calibration scores
derived fromconﬁdence judgments do not chimewith the results derived fromother
tasks, like binary judgments or betting decisions (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Higham
et al., in press; see also Scheck and Nelson, 2005; England and Serra, 2012, for related
discussion). Given the theoretical problems surrounding calibration results, we did
not analyze this aspect of the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring in the present
study.
2The degrees of freedom in this analysis differ from other analyses presented here
because the AUC measure in at least one of the condition could not be computed
for ﬁve participants, who had no incorrect responses in some conditions. These
participants were excluded from this analysis.
η2 = 0.02, with lower resolution in the presence of distraction.
A main effect of type of test was also signiﬁcant, F(2,72) = 8.93,
MSE = 0.01, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.20, η2 = 0.08. This effect emerged
because, collapsed across distraction conditions, resolution was
better in the simple recognition tests as compared to both asso-
ciative recognition, t(36) = 4.14, SE = 0.02, p < 0.002, and
recombined recognition, t(36) = 3.31, SE = 0.02, p = 0.002, while
the resolution in the latter tests did not differ, t < 1. The interac-
tion of distraction and type of test conditions was not signiﬁcant,
F < 1. The curves from which the AUC measure was derived are
given in Figure 3.
The main conclusion from the above analyses is that distrac-
tion impairs resolution of metacognitive monitoring. Thus, the
distraction seems to be doubly damaging. It undermines memory
performance by impairing access to memory records (as described
earlier) and it also impairs participants’ ability to indicate which
of their responses in memory test are correct and which are
incorrect.
REPORT CRITERION
The third question addressed here is whether in the presence of
distraction participants adjust their report criterion. The mea-
sure of criterion placement, Prc, was computed according to the
methodology described by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996). Each
decimal value on a conﬁdence scale was considered as a possible
placement of the report criterion by computing, ﬁrst, the number
of items that were assigned conﬁdence higher than this value and
which were volunteered in the free-report test (hits), and second,
the number of items that were assigned conﬁdence lower than
this value and which were withheld in the free-report test (correct
rejections). Hits and correct rejections were used to derive a ﬁt
ratio, which is a ratio of the sum of hits and correct rejections to
the number of items in a memory test. The value with the highest
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FIGURE 3 | Hit rates (HR) plotted against false alarm rates (FAR) for distraction (Dist) and silent control conditions on the associative, simple, and
recombined testing conditions.
ﬁt ratio was chosen as the placement of the report criterion and
whenever an interval of values was characterized by the same ﬁt
ratio, the high boundary of this interval was chosen. This proce-
dure of deriving thePrc measurewas followed in all six conditionof
the study. Reduceddegrees of freedom for the analyses of Prc reﬂect
the fact that some participants either volunteered or withheld all
answers in the free-report test in at least one of the conditions, pre-
cluding the calculation of Prc. This measure was analyzed with a 2
(distraction) × 3 (type of test) ANOVA, which failed to reveal any
signiﬁcant effects, F(2,74) = 1.13, MSE = 79.66, p = 0.33, for the
main effect of test, andFs< 1, for themain effect of distraction and
the interaction. These results indicate that the level of conﬁdence
required by participants to volunteer an answer in the free-report
test was independent of the lack of distraction and the type of
test.
IBA AND OBA MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Finally, we examined the IBA and OBA measures of memory
performance in the free-report test3. For the OBA measure of per-
formance in free-report tests, a 2 (distraction) × 3 (type of test)
ANOVA yielded a signiﬁcant main of type of test, F(2,80) = 15.87,
MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28, η2 = 0.19, which exactly
paralleled the effect observed for forced-report accuracy: better
3One participant was removed from all analyses involving the OBA measure because
this person responded “don’t know” to all questions in one of the conditions,
precluding the calculation of the OBA measure.
performance for the recombined test than for the associative test,
t(40) = 2.33, SE = 0.02, p = 0.02, and still better performance
for the simple (vs. recombined) test, t(40) = 3.02, SE = 0.02,
p = 0.004. The main effect of distraction was not signiﬁcant,
F(1,40) = 3.22, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.08. The same 2 (distrac-
tion) × 3 (type of test) ANOVA on the IBA measure yielded a
signiﬁcantmain effect of distraction,F(1,41)= 27.30,MSE= 0.02,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.40, η2 = 0.12, showing that IBA was worse
under distraction. A main effect of type of test came close to sig-
niﬁcance, F(2,82) = 3.06, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.052, η2p = 0.07,
η2 = 0.03. This arose because IBA was higher in simple recog-
nition than in associative recognition, a result which also just
missed signiﬁcance, t(41) = 1.89, SE = 0.02, p = 0.07, and
higher also in simple recognition than in recombined recogni-
tion, t(41) = 2.60, SE = 0.02, p = 0.014. Altogether, these results
largely track the effects obtained with forced-report accuracy
and, most importantly, indicate that participants’ performance,
at least if indexed by the IBA measure, is impaired under distrac-
tion when participants can respond “don’t know” in a memory
test.
4According to the yes/no logic of signiﬁcance testing, these results should be treated
with caution as there is an enhanced possibility of false positiveswhen reporting such
results after a null main effect. However, it is of interest to see how the data break
down in cases (such as this) which so narrowly fall short of reaching conventional
signiﬁcance and we do not base any strong theoretical claims on these particular
outcomes.
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GAINS AND LOSSES FROM USING THE “DON’T KNOW” OPTION
The fact that performance was impaired in free-report tests under
distraction can be easily explained by the fact that distraction
affects memory access directly, as revealed in the forced-report
steps. Interest remains, however, in how metamemory processes
contribute to the effects observed in theOBAand IBAmeasures. To
examine this issue, we focused on changes in performance indices
between forced- and free-report tests. Koriat and Goldsmith
(1996)describehowallowingparticipants to respond“don’t know”
should lead to participants screening out candidate responses
they are not sure about, which in turn should generally lead to
an increase in the quality of output at the cost to the quantity
(see also Figure 1). The question addressed in the next set of
analyses is whether the increases in quality and reductions in quan-
tity between forced- and free-report tests were inﬂuenced by the
distraction condition.
First, we calculated increases in quality brought about by
exercising control over reporting in free-report tests. For each
participant, we subtracted his or her forced-report accuracy from
the OBA measure in order to calculate the gains achieved by with-
holding answers. For this measure, higher scores indicate a larger
increase in the quality of output between forced- and free-report
tests. The analysis of gains of exercising the “don’t know” option
with a 2 (distraction) × 3 (type of test) ANOVA revealed no sig-
niﬁcant main effect of distraction, albeit a main effect that once
again came close to conventional signiﬁcance, F(1,40) = 3.44,
MSE = 0.01, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.079, η2 = 0.02. This arose because
participants’ quality of output increased more from forced- to
free-report tests when distraction was present. Although this anal-
ysis comes close to suggesting larger gains from exercising the
“don’t know” option under distraction, the compared conditions
differ also in the forced-report recognition performance, which
was lower under distraction. Any difference in gains may thus
be simply due to the fact that more correct responses are to be
gained by using the “don’t know” option in the distraction con-
dition. To verify if this is indeed the case, we collapsed across
type of test conditions (which did not interact with distraction
in the initial analysis) and performed an additional analysis of
covariance which controlled for the difference in forced-report
recognition performance when comparing gains between two
distraction conditions. With the difference in forced-report recog-
nition performance as a covariate, the difference in gains between
distraction and silent conditions fell well short of conventional
signiﬁcance, F < 1. It thus appears that although participants gain
more in terms of quality when they use the “don’t know” option
under distraction, this effect can be accounted for simply by the
greater potential for gain given the lower baseline rather than any
more fundamental difference in the effectiveness of metacognitive
processes.
To construct the measure of the reduction in the quantity of
output, we subtracted the IBA measure from forced-report accu-
racy. For this measure, higher scores mean that more correct
responses were lost from forced- to free-report test. The analysis
of losses from exercising the “don’t know” option with a 2 (dis-
traction) × 3 (type of test) ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main
effect of type of test, F(2,82) = 12.37, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.23, η2 = 0.11, which arose because losses were reliably
lower in the associative recognition test, than in both simple recog-
nition, t(41) = 3.87, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001, and recombined tests,
t(41) = 5.13, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001. Losses for the latter two tests
did not differ from each other, t < 1. More importantly, a sig-
niﬁcant main effect of distraction was revealed, F(1,41) = 9.74,
MSE = 0.01, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.19, η2 = 0.05, which points
to higher losses from exercising the “don’t know” option in the
presence (vs. absence) of distraction. The interaction was not
signiﬁcant, F < 1. We conducted a similar covariance analy-
sis as before to account for the difference in the forced-report
recognition performance between distraction and silent condi-
tions. Collapsing across type of test conditions, the analysis with
the difference in forced-report performance between silent and
distraction conditions as a covariate still revealed a reliable differ-
ence between distraction and silent conditions in terms of losses,
F(1,40) = 10.34, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.21, η2 = 0.20.
Thus, in contrast to the analysis of gains, greater losses in the
quantity of output in the distraction condition were not due to
differences in the forced-report recognition performance between
silent and distraction conditions.
The analyses of gains and losses arising from exercising the
“don’t know” option revealed that allowing the “don’t know”
response in a memory test under distraction bears important con-
sequences for the ﬁnal performance. On the one hand, participants
in the present study initially appeared to gain more in terms of
quality in the distraction compared to the silent condition. This
effect, however, did not stem from any differences in metacogni-
tive processes but simply from the fact that with lower memory
performance participants had more to gain under auditory dis-
traction. More cogently, the presence of distraction caused also
greater losses in term of quantity of correct responses when par-
ticipants were allowed to respond “don’t know.” This effect was
independent of differences in forced-report recognition in silent
and distraction condition and thus must reﬂect a metacognitive
effect.
The effect of greater losses of correct responses under distrac-
tion might, in principle, be the result of two different mechanisms.
One such mechanism is reduced relative accuracy of metacogni-
tive monitoring under distraction. When participants are worse in
assessing which their candidate responses are correct and incor-
rect, using the “don’t know” option can lead to withholding of
more correct responses. To assess this account, we performed an
additional covariance analysis in which differences in the AUC
measure between the distraction and silent conditions (again col-
lapsed across different tests) served as a covariate for the analysis of
losses5. This analysis again resulted in a reliable differences in losses
between the distraction and silent conditions, F(1,35) = 4.79,
MSE = 0.003, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.12, η2 = 0.11, suggesting that
differences in the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring cannot
account for the observed pattern of losses.
A second mechanism that can account for greater losses under
distraction is reduced conﬁdence in correct responses. If partic-
ipants are overall less conﬁdent in their correct responses under
distraction, then fewer of these correct candidate responses will
5Five participants were excluded from this analysis due to incomplete set of AUC
results.
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pass the rigid response criterion (see the earlier analysis of the
Prc measure). To test this hypothesis we analyzed conﬁdence
for answers that were correct on the forced-report recognition
tests. The analysis of conﬁdence with a 2 (distraction) × 3
(type of test) ANOVA yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of test,
F(2,82) = 12.45, MSE = 44.21, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.233, η2 = 0.114,
which arose because conﬁdence in correct responses was lower
in the recombined test than in either the simple recognition test,
t(41) = 4.33, SE = 1.06, p < 0.001, or the associative recognition
test, t(41) = 3.87, SE = 1.10, p< 0.001, which did not differ from
each other, t < 1. More importantly, the main effect of distrac-
tion was also signiﬁcant, F(1,41) = 26.97,MSE = 37.50, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.397,η2 = 0.105, conﬁrming that participants were less con-
ﬁdent in their correct responses under distraction. The interaction
was not signiﬁcant, F(2,82) = 1.58, MSE = 28.01, p = 0.21. To
ensure that lowered conﬁdence in correct responses under distrac-
tion found its reﬂection in the pattern of response volunteering,we
also analyzed the rates of “don’t know” responding for responses
that were correct on the forced-report recognition test. A 2 (dis-
traction) × 3 (type of test) ANOVA yielded a signiﬁcant main
effect of type of test, F(2,82) = 4.99, MSE = 0.017, p = 0.009,
η2p = 0.108, η2 = 0.045, which arose because participants more
often responded “don’t know” for questions scored as correct in
the forced-report recombined test than in either the forced-report
simple recognition test, t(41) = 2.06, SE = 0.02, p = 0.046, or the
forced-report associative recognition test, t(41) = 2.88, SE = 0.02,
p = 0.006, which in turn did not differ, t(41) = 1.14, SE = 0.02,
p = 0.26. Again, the main effect of distraction was signiﬁcant, F(1,
41) = 15.94, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.280, η2 = 0.09, with
fewer responses that were correct on the forced-report test volun-
teered under distraction6. These analyses indicate that distraction
affects performance when a “don’t know” response is allowed by
reducing conﬁdence in correct candidate responses, which leads to
fewer correct responses being volunteered. Overall, reduced conﬁ-
dence under distraction is related to greater response withholding,
this constitutes a metacognitive mechanism by which distraction
exerts inﬂuence over memory performance.
DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate memory and
metacognitive processes under auditory distraction. The main
results can be summarized in few points. First, distraction consis-
tently impaired memory as revealed by forced-report recognition
accuracy. Thus, there was an effect of distraction on cogni-
tion under forced-choice conditions. Second, distraction affected
metacognitive monitoring of retrieval by impairing participants’
ability to distinguish between their own correct and incorrect
candidate responses (as reﬂected in the conﬁdence measures).
Thus, there was also an effect of distraction on metacognitive
6Although incorrect responses do not contribute to the pattern of losses which is
discussed here, for completeness we separately analyzed conﬁdence and the rate of
“don’t know” responses when an incorrect response was given in the forced-report
test. Since quite a few participants had no incorrect forced-report responses in one
or more cells of the full design, for the present analyses we collapsed across the type
of test variable, which resulted in excluding two participants only. The comparisons
of quiet and distraction conditions in terms of both conﬁdence in incorrect forced-
report responses (62.14 vs. 63.15) and the rate of “don’t know” responses when
forced-response was incorrect (0.66 vs. 0.66) were not signiﬁcant, ts< 1.
outcomes. Third, participants did not try to strategically com-
pensate for the loss in the quantity of output under distraction
by lowering their report criterion. Instead, participants used the
same report criterion in all conditions of our study. Fourth, dis-
traction affected both beneﬁts and costs of using the “don’t know”
option. Larger gains in accuracy under distraction stemmed from
the fact that, with poorer memory in the presence of distrac-
tion, participants had more to gain by withholding responses.
However, losses in terms of quantity of correct responses were
also larger under distraction, stemming from the fact that par-
ticipants were generally less conﬁdent in their correct responses
when distraction was present, leading to more prevalent with-
holding of these correct responses. Thus, there appeared to
be an impact of some metacognitive factors (conﬁdence) but
not on others (report criterion or threshold) on the distraction
observed. A limitation of the study is that, because distraction
was present at both encoding and retrieval we are unable to
tease apart potentially different impacts on metacognitive pro-
cesses at these stages. The literature on auditory distraction shows
that some distractors (so-called “changing-state” irrelevant sound
distractors, Jones et al., 1992; Jones and Macken, 1993) operat-
ing on short-term serial order episodic memory (Beaman and
Jones, 1997) are equipotent at encoding and retrieval (Miles et al.,
1991) whereas semantic auditory distractors operating on seman-
tic memory lose potency to induce false positive errors when
presented only during a retention period (Marsh et al., 2008).
Thus, this particular area is open to further research in which
both the types of distraction and the period of distraction are
varied.
The fact that auditory distraction is harmful for visual memory
performance is hardly surprising given numerous studies which
already document such detrimental effects. However, the present
study allows for a clearer picture of how impairment in perfor-
mance is caused by distraction affecting both memory access
directly, and metacognitive processes responsible for translating
retrieved information into free-report performance. The study
was built on the assumption borrowed from the framework by
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) that performance in a test allowing
for “don’t know” responses is dependent on both memory and
metacognitive processes. Here we demonstrated that auditory dis-
traction affects both memory and metacognition, which jointly
determine performance in free-report tests.
In our study we included a forced-report test in which with-
holding responses was not possible, thus minimizing the role of
metacognitive processes. The fact that distraction impaired forced-
report responding provides further support for previous research
using this format of testing (e.g., LeCompte, 1994; Beaman and
Jones, 1997) in showing that auditory distraction has a negative
impact on core memory processes. Importantly, we used three
different types of recognition test, in which performance was at
least partially supported by distinct memory processes of famil-
iarity and recollection and yet the effects of auditory distraction
were exactly the same in all these tests. This observation points to
a general disruptive effects of distraction upon various memory
processes regardless of the relative contribution of recollection and
familiarity in these tests. This is surprising given the differential
impact of auditory distraction upon other memory tasks – notably
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the reliable impact upon probed or serial recall which is either
absent or much reduced in a “missing item task” in which par-
ticipants are required to identify which member of a well-known
set was not presented at study (Beaman and Jones, 1997). Here, it
seems plausible that familiarity might be used to identify missing
items (by recalling all items from the set and assessing which has
the lowest familiarity level) whereas recollection is necessary for
probed recall. These tasks differ in other ways, however, notably
the requirement to recall a pairwise, positional, or serial-order
association for the probed recall task – arguably also present in
the current set of 2AFC recognition tests, which is entirely absent
from a missing item recall task (see also Jones and Macken, 1993;
Beaman and Jones, 1998).
In this observation of generalized effects of auditory distraction
by speech on memory processes, our results also stand in con-
trast to the recent results obtained by Wais and Gazzaley (2011),
who documented the effects of distraction in a test dependent on
recollection but not in the test dependent on familiarity. Vari-
ous procedural differences may underlie this discrepancy but the
most likely seems to be that whereas Wais and Gazzaley (2011)
played distraction during retrieval only, in our study distraction
was present during both encoding and retrieval. Some researchers
(e.g., Neath, 2000) have argued that the effects of auditory distrac-
tion are similar to the effects of manipulations imposing cognitive
load, like for example requiring participants to engage in an
additional cognitive task apart from encoding and retrieval. Dual-
task manipulations, when implemented at the time of a memory
test, are known to affect recollection, leaving familiarity rela-
tively intact (e.g., Gruppuso et al., 1997). By contrast, dual-task
manipulations implemented at the time of encoding affect both
recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2001). Thus, our ﬁndings
of auditorydistraction effects of similarmagnitude in recollection-
and familiarity-based tests can be easily reconciled with ﬁndings
pointing to speciﬁc recollection impairment obtained by Wais and
Gazzaley (2011) if one is willing to assume that auditory distrac-
tion, in some respects, works similarly to an additional cognitive
task, putting tax on attentional resources available for encod-
ing and retrieval7. Pilot data from our lab support this idea, by
showing an impact of auditory distraction upon pupillometric
measures of cognitive effort at encoding. To conclude, it is likely
that it is our design choice of presenting distraction both at encod-
ing and at retrieval that precluded us from observing differential
effects of auditory distraction on familiarity and recollection. This
issue could be pursued in further studies that could factorially
manipulate when distraction is presented to examine performance
in recognition tests sensitive to familiarity and recollection effects.
The results documented in our study with free-report tests
also reveal that effects of distraction do not end with impair-
ing memory processes. Auditory distraction has important
consequences for how accurate people are in monitoring their
7Note, however, that there are multiple types of auditory distraction (e.g., those
based around the acoustics of the distractor and those based upon the lexical and
semantic status of speech) which appear to impact on different tasks differentially
(Hughes and Jones, 2003; Beaman, 2005a; Jones et al., 2010). Without further inves-
tigation varying the distractor type do not know which type of distraction we (or
Wais and Gazzaley, 2011) observed.
memory processes, as revealed by impaired resolution of con-
ﬁdence judgments under distraction. Even more importantly,
auditory distraction modiﬁes metacognitive control and thus
shapes performance when the“don’t know”option is available in a
memory test. Participants seem to be aware that auditory distrac-
tion is harmful for memory as they become much less conﬁdent in
their correct responses when distraction is present (see also Eller-
meier and Zimmer, 1997; Beaman, 2005b). In their responding
on a free-report test they strive to attain a similar level of accu-
racy of reported responses whether distraction is present or not, as
revealed by an equal report criterion between distraction and quiet
conditions. However, since participants are generally less conﬁ-
dent, fewer correct candidate responses pass the report criterion
when distraction is present. With fewer correct responses volun-
teered, the IBA measure of accuracy suffers. Not only is the IBA
measure lower under distraction but also losses in quantity caused
by using the “don’t know” option are higher when distraction is
present.
This last ﬁnding is important inasmuch as it testiﬁes to
metacognitive contributions to performance decrement caused by
distraction in free-report tests. When free-report test are used, the
IBAmeasure of performance is commonly interpreted as reﬂecting
memory processes only (cf. Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996; Hancza-
kowski et al., 2014). This can be gleaned from paradigms using
free recall, a par excellence IBA measure of performance, in which
results are discussed in terms of memory, not metamemory. In
respect to auditory distraction, several recent papers dealing with
distraction semantically related to memoranda have revealed per-
formance decrements in free recall tests under semantic auditory
distraction (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). What the present study
underscores is that results obtained with free recall tests should be
interpreted in view of distraction impacting upon both memory
and metacognitive processes. It thus remains to be examined if
auditory distractions semantically related to memoranda impact
upon metacognitive processes, changing the pattern of conﬁdence
and“don’t know” responding, and thus contributing to the overall
pattern of free recall impairment.
In conclusion, the present study showed how auditory distrac-
tion affects both memory processes and metacognitive processes
that inﬂuence memory reporting. In broadest terms, auditory dis-
traction when present at both encoding and retrieval negatively
impacts upon a spectrum of performance measures in memory
tasks. However, a speciﬁc pattern of impairment in these measures
is visible, shaped by the effects distraction has on metacognitive
processes, with important roles of the overall level of conﬁ-
dence assigned to correct candidate responses and the ability to
distinguish between one’s own correct and incorrect candidate
responses.
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